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Trends in Communist Media

4 Sep 75

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

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4 SEPTEMBER 1975
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SINAI AGREEMENT

USSR SEES U.S. "COMPLICATIONS," CAIRO CONCESSIONS IN ACCORD

Moscow has reacted with evident distaste to the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement accord on Sinai, initialed on 1 September, particularly with regard to the projected U.S. presence at early-warning stations in Sinai. PRAVDA on the 30th set the tone by describing the U.S. presence as a "complicating factor," a phrase reiterated in subsequent comment which has played up U.S. Congressional doubts and misgivings in "certain U.S. circles" that this might lead to dangerous results, "as happened in Vietnam." One commentator has implied that Washington failed to honor the agreement, in the U.S.-Soviet communique of 3 July 1974, that the two countries would "maintain close contacts and coordinate efforts" to achieve a peaceful Mideast settlement. The Moscow media have in effect underlined Soviet displeasure with the agreement by remaining silent on the scheduled 4 September signing of the accord in Geneva, although earlier Cairo reports had anticipated Soviet attendance.* The Syrians were informed by the Soviet ambassador that the USSR would not participate in the signing ceremony, according to Damascus radio on the 4th.

While there has been no authoritative Soviet reaction as yet, reportage and routine-level comment have portrayed the accord as constituting Egyptian concessions to Israel in return for restoration of "only a small part" of occupied Sinai. Moscow has displayed skepticism over Egypt's contention that the new agreement is of a purely military nature, observing that it "clearly" has political aspects. Soviet media have publicized Arab objections to the accord for its disruption of Arab unity, and comment has repeatedly stressed that the present step, like the 1974 partial disengagement agreements, does not address the basic issues and in fact tends to "freeze" the situation. Moscow has again suggested that the Geneva conference--with "careful preparation"--is the proper forum for seeking a final settlement.

TREATMENT OF ACCORD In dispatches on the 2d, TASS briefly reported from Cairo on some elements of the three documents made public on the second disengagement agreement--the basic agreement, the annex providing guidelines for preparation

* Moscow's apparent desire to disassociate itself from the current accord contrasts sharply with Soviet efforts to claim some share of the credit for the 1974 disengagement agreements, particularly the May 1974 Golan accord. See the TRENDS of 5 June 1974, pages 1-2.

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of a protocol on implementation, and what TASS called "the annex on use of American specialists" at early-warning posts in the Sinai.* The TASS dispatches, as well as initial Moscow radio comment on the 2d, highlighted what TASS called Cairo's "additional concessions" in return for "minor" Israeli troop withdrawals from the Abu Rudays oilfields and the Sinai passes. In effect picturing Egypt as caving in to Israeli demands with relatively few gains in return, TASS noted that the Israelis were "able to prevail upon the Egyptians" to renounce the use or threat of force and to tone down their political campaign against Israel. The TASS dispatches and radio commentaries by A. Zlatorunskiy and I. Penchenko pointed out that Egypt would permit the passage of Israeli cargoes--also reported as Israeli "ships"--through the Suez Canal, and that it undertook not to block the Bab el-Mandeb strait and to stop the boycott of U.S. firms which trade with Israel. TASS also pointed out that the sides pledged to observe the cease-fire on land, water and in the air.

Under a Washington dateline, the TASS accounts cited the Washington POST to the effect that Israel had accepted the Sinai agreement only after a "secret understanding" was reached with the United States on U.S. aid, "probably to the tune of 2.5 to 3 billion dollars a year." Referring to the POST article, TASS said that "military experts" were afraid such aid would disrupt the balance of armaments in the Middle East to such a degree that the Arab countries would "panic," with the result that they would "again request weapons from other countries," and the end result would be war.

U.S., SOVIET Moscow seems to be in a dilemma about its role as
GENEVA ROLES co-sponsor of the Geneva conference. Scattered
comment is again somewhat hesitantly advocating
renewal of the Geneva conference, but Moscow apparently has
declined to attend the 4 September signing ceremony in Geneva to
avoid giving its imprimatur to the new accord. This contrasts
with the Soviet position, first set forth in the Soviet-Egyptian
communique on Foreign Minister Fahmi's April 1975 visit, which
stated that any partial measures and corresponding decisions on
them "must be a component, inseparable part of a general settle-
ment and must be worked out and taken within the framework" of
the Geneva conference.** (Along similar lines, Soviet UN

* Moscow's handling of the January 1974 Sinai disengagement accord is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 1-5.

** The Fahmi visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April 1975, pages 8-12.

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representative Ovinokov had remarked at a late July Security Council session, according to TASS, that the Geneva forum could solve all matters related to an overall settlement and to "separate measures in the framework of an overall settlement.")

Moscow thus far has made no mention of the elements in the just-concluded "basic agreement" which provide a link to the Geneva conference by recalling in Article 1 that the January 1974 agreement, "within the framework of the Geneva peace conference," constituted a first step toward peace, and pledging in Article 8 to continue to negotiate a peace agreement "within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338."

In the strongest expression thus far of Soviet indignation at being left out of the action, TASS Deputy Director General Sergey Losev, in a 2 September commentary broadcast to North American audiences, implied that the United States was misusing detente in the Middle East. He pointed out that President Ford, in a 25 August TV interview in Milwaukee, had denied assertions that detente was of advantage to Russia alone and had stressed that it was a two-way street; Losev further cited the President as saying, in a 31 August TV interview, that in the unstable Mideast situation the Soviet Union had displayed statesmanship. But Losev clearly suggested that while the Soviet Union was "conscientiously and scrupulously" observing its commitments under U.S.-Soviet summit agreements, Washington's attitude left something to be desired. Losev pointedly recalled that in the July 1974 Soviet-American summit communique, the sides agreed to maintain close contacts and coordinate efforts with regard to a Mideast settlement, and also "deemed it important" that the Geneva conference resume its work as soon as possible. The Soviet Union had "kept strictly to the agreed line," Losev said, while the United States "on the other hand" followed the path of "so-called partial solutions."

Citing a CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR report that American officials were increasingly convinced that it would be "catastrophic" if, on the heels of the Sinai talks, there was no agreement for further Geneva conference negotiations, Losev concluded that "the most suitable forum" for seeking a just peace was still the Geneva conference.*

U.S. PRESENCE IN SINAI Moscow has evinced increasing displeasure over the prospect of U.S. civilian personnel being present at Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. surveillance stations in the Sinai. In an early reference to the possible

* Other aspects of the Losev commentary are discussed in the "U.S.-Soviet Relations" section of this TRENDS.

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stationing of "American technicians," a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on 18 August had indicated disapproval of the idea of injecting "foreign machinery--in this instance American--that has no connection with the United Nations and its emergency forces." While levoting increasing attention to the prospect of a U.S. role, Moscow has refrained from outright objection. TASS on the 3d, however, did report an Israeli Communist Party resolution as stressing that the presence of U.S. technical personnel "is a violation of UN resolutions on the Middle East," introducing a new element of tension.

An I. Kalita article in PRAVDA on the 30th, the day before the new agreement was initialed, seemed to set the tone for subsequent comment. Kalita, commenting on press reports about the creation of "some kind of U.S. 'monitoring group,'" called this a "new and complicating element" which might be introduced into the situation. Confirming these reports, Kalita said, U.S. officials put the number of "U.S. 'observers' armed with 'hand weapons'" at 100-150 people. Kalita noted that since 1973 there had been an "effective system" of cease-fire and disengagement monitoring by UN armed forces "and a group of military observers" whose status, numbers, and national composition had been determined through Security Council decisions. "Commentators are asking loudly," he added, why this procedure "has to be disrupted" and the international mechanism "replaced" by "one-sided national monitoring by only one power, whose pro-Israeli position is no secret to anyone."

In PRAVDA's international review the next day, Demchenko, reiterating Kalita's points, also asserted that "unilateral control is expected to replace" the present system employing UN forces and observers. While both PRAVDA writers suggested that a U.S. presence would "replace" the UNEF, TASS, on the other hand, did report from Cairo on 2 September that as-Sadat, at a press conference after the initialing of the agreement, said he would agree to prolongation of the UNEF mandate "so that everything would be all right at home for President Ford in the course of the 1976 pre-election campaign." Soviet accounts apparently have not taken note of Article 5 of the new agreement, which stated that the UNEF mandate would be extended annually.

While TASS reportage before and after the initialing of the agreement has referred to the possible posting of American "specialists" or "civilian specialists," Kalita and other commentators have described the U.S. personnel as "military." IZVESTIYA observer Sturua, on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program on the 31st, remarked that "international observers" noted that the planned stationing of "American personnel--to be blunt about it, military

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personnel"--might introduce a further complicating factor in the tense Mideast situation. And Zlatorunskiy, in an Arabic-language commentary on 2 September, cited TIME magazine as reporting that 150 "American military, particularly from the intelligence units," would be dispatched. Moscow did not pick up U.S. press reports, just before Secretary Kissinger's departure on his recent tour, citing State Department officials to the effect that U.S. technicians could be drawn from private industry or from government agencies such as the Defense Department, CIA or NSA. But IZVESTIYA on 28 August did cite a "prominent U.S. official who is always sent where Kissinger goes" as saying that at least some of the technical specialists would be enlisted from the CIA.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS Moscow's negative attitude toward the new agreement promptly drew a front-page article by AL-AHRAM editor 'Ali Hamdi al-Jammal on 4 September countering "Soviet press criticism" that the accord would not lead to peace. Reciting Cairo's standard grievances against Moscow over arms supplies and debt rescheduling, he asked why the Soviet Union, which was furthering its policy of detente with the United States, was angered when Egypt tried to balance its relations with the superpowers. He observed that the USSR was unhappy over the disengagement agreement, "although Moscow has been informed of all the details of the agreement by America and approved it."

President as-Sadat, asked at a 2 September meeting with Egyptian journalists about the Soviet attitude toward the agreement, said he had asked Foreign Minister Fahmi to send the text of the accord to the Soviet leaders. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported that in meetings with the Soviet charge d'affaires on 2 and 3 September, Fahmi had conveyed a message to Gromyko and had also received from him a "lengthy message" on the new Sinai accord.

As-Sadat may well have anticipated difficulties with Moscow over the new agreement. In an interview with the Beirut AL-HAWADITH published on 15 August, he had said that the Soviet leaders acted "as if I had committed high treason" against them "because I did not ask for their prior permission" before concluding the January 1974 disengagement agreement.

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PORTUGAL

MOSCOW NOTES PUBLIC "APPROVAL" OF GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES

Moscow has again issued an authoritative PRAVDA Observer article on Portugal, the second in less than two weeks and more of a curiosity than a contribution, as it offers no new formulations nor even any apparent merit of timeliness. Soviet media promptly accommodated themselves to the 29 August announcement of Portuguese changes which moved Vasco Goncalves from the post of prime minister to the position of armed forces chief of staff and appointed Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo to the prime ministerial post. Moscow has noted Azevedo's statement urging the socialist, communist and popular democratic parties to hammer out a platform in support of the government, at the same time emphasizing Portuguese communist leader Cunhal's call for a joint meeting of communists and socialists. Soviet correspondents have indicated increasing concern over the conflicting currents in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), earlier portrayed as the bulwark of the MFA-people's alliance of the Portuguese revolution, and have taken to bemoaning the political instability of "certain military leaders."

Continuing to charge the West with meddling in Portuguese affairs, Moscow has belatedly rejected Western press reports of Soviet funds channeled to the Portuguese Communist Party through a Soviet-Belgian shipping company. TASS commentator Goncharov on the 29th labeled the reports "a vicious attempt" to add fuel to the fire being kindled by the Portuguese reaction, and claimed that it was not the PCP but the party of Socialist leader Mario Soares which was receiving foreign support.

PRAVDA "OBSERVER" The 30 August PRAVDA Observer article, the second such article on Portugal in less than two weeks, provides nothing more than a hackneyed replay of recent Soviet comment on Portugal. The question arises as to why such an innocuous article was issued at Observer level and at this time. Observer seemed to be carrying out its ideological duty with a limp defense of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), struggling for "freedom and social progress" for "almost half a century." With all due regard for the Portuguese comrades, Observer--like other recent comment--covered his bets with an expression of solidarity for not only the PCP but "all" democratic and progressive forces and "patriots" of Portugal. Observer also served up a melange of accusations against domestic and foreign culprits--the Socialist Party (PS) leadership and assorted nameless provocateurs, former regime elements and "certain" church dignitaries, as well as NATO, the EC, and West European social democrats.

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If the Observer article was intended to register support for a comradely party, it fell far short of past Soviet efforts in this regard. Over the years Moscow from time to time has demonstrated disapproval of actions taken against communist parties in non-communist countries through the device of statements by the CPSU Central Committee, such as one issued in September 1973 on the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile.* The Observer article might conceivably have been intended to set the stage for an "international campaign of solidarity" with Portuguese "patriots," although it did not even go as far as the 19 August Observer article, which had advocated demonstrations of "mass solidarity."

DOMESTIC Soviet media correspondents, at times hardpressed
DEVELOPMENTS to fit their assessments to the rapid pace of
developments, adapted quickly to President Costa
Gomes' 29 August announcement that controversial Prime Minister
Vasco Goncalves had been appointed chief of staff, yielding his
prime ministerial post to Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo. Having
portrayed the Goncalves government as functioning to the last
against all odds, Moscow quickly noted approval of the president's
decision by the "progressive Portuguese public." Presumably
relieved that the long-expected ouster of Goncalves had left both
the prime ministerial post and the armed forces leadership in the
hands of men not openly unfriendly to Moscow's interests, Moscow
radio observer Igor Charikov remarked on the 30th that Azevedo--
"one of the most steadfast and courageous of the Portuguese revo-
lution's fighters"--shared with Goncalves a "unity of views on
basic questions." And on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program
on the 31st, Albert Grigoryants said that the "democratic public
notes that these decisions are a step on the path toward overcoming
the crisis."

Commentators have sometimes fallen afoul of developments, as when
TASS correspondent Kovalev, in a special dispatch for IZVESTIYA
appearing in the 29 August issue, jumped on the leftist front band-
wagon with the opinion that the creation, four days earlier, of the
"revolutionary front" of leftist parties and organizations was "the
most important event" of recent days. Three days later the front
appeared to collapse with exchanges of recriminations over PCP
leader Cunhal's 28 August press conference proposal for a meeting
and possibly other joint action by communists, socialists and
other political forces. PRAVDA correspondents Yermakov and Kotov,

* See the TRENDS of 19 September 1973, pages 1-2.

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discussing the proposal in a 31 August dispatch, noted that participation by the Socialist Party was now "particularly essential and urgent," and Moscow radio correspondent Igor Fesunenکو on 2 September reported Prime Minister-designate Azevedo as stressing the need for a "common platform in support of the government" on the part of "the three leading parties-- the socialist, popular democratic, and communist." Fesunenکو also noted Azevedo's remark that "without such a platform it is impossible to rule the country."

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW REMAINS DISCREET ON RECENT ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS

Moscow has been notably circumspect in its reaction to recent statements by Ford Administration officials warning of the consequences of certain Soviet actions considered inimical to U.S. interests. In particular, Moscow is not known to have reported or commented directly on President Ford's 19 August American Legion convention remarks threatening increased spending on strategic weapon programs unless "real progress" was achieved in SALT TWO. Moscow has also excised or obscured in its reporting other recent remarks by the President and by Secretary of State Kissinger on the contentious Portugal issue.

Moscow's discreet handling of Administration statements is consistent with the policy it has followed since the Moscow summit in 1972. Although Moscow has revealed concern in recent months over what it apparently regards as an emergent hardline trend in the United States, it has identified this trend with personalities and groups which it depicts as hostile to the Administration. It has portrayed the Administration itself as a resolute defender of detente, going so far in some commentaries as to expressly thank the President for his public defense of detente--a gesture also made by Ponomarev in his remarks to visiting U.S. congressmen in August. In brief, Moscow is continuing to present an image of U.S. foreign policy which fails to suggest to the Soviet domestic audience that the Ford Administration may have adopted a correct but cooler posture on detente in recent weeks.

FORD, KISSINGER SPEECHES Central Soviet press reports of President Ford's Minneapolis speech to the American Legion highlighted his favorable remarks on detente. Those accounts did quote him as urging that "the military might of the United States be strengthened and its military budget increased," but they did not report his linkage of SALT and defense spending or his reference to the importance of U.S. "qualitative superiority" in weapons. Soviet media also failed to report the President's statement that he was "watching carefully" Soviet actions in Portugal, quoting him only as saying that the Portuguese "must be given the opportunity to find a solution in an atmosphere free of outside pressure."

Secretary Kissinger's 14 August comments in Birmingham on the Soviet Union and Portugal were treated in a similar fashion by Moscow. In reporting his favorable comments on detente, the media made no mention of his remarks that the United States has "never

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accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively" and that Moscow "should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future."

SIGNS OF SENSITIVITY The gingerly treatment given recent Administration statements in Soviet media indicates that they have struck a sensitive chord in Moscow. Moreover, Moscow did finally register a mild protest, in a 2 September broadcast to North America by Sergey Losev, a TASS deputy director general. Losev noted approvingly that the White House has "repeatedly disassociated itself from malicious attempts to set the American public against peaceful coexistence," but he went on to complain that "unfortunately even senior officials in the U.S. Administration sometimes strike the wrong note" with "clearly misdirected warnings to the Soviet Union not to fish in muddy waters, not to use reduction in tension as a cover for attempts to obtain one-sided advantages." Losev, as have some Western observers, linked such statements to the exigencies of domestic politics, noting that they appear "especially in what are clearly election speeches and are aimed apparently at attracting the sympathies of rightwing circles.*

* Losev's specific complaints about U.S. policy in the Middle East are discussed in the first, Sinai Agreement section of this TRENDS.

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UNGA SESSION

MOSCOW CRITICIZES KISSINGER ECONOMIC PROPOSALS

Initial Moscow comment on Secretary Kissinger's proposals to promote economic cooperation between developed and developing nations, contained in a 1 September message to the UN General Assembly special session, has portrayed them as an attempt to perpetuate Western exploitation of the Third World.

Although Moscow so far has largely avoided discussing any of the details of the Secretary's proposals, a 3 September PRAVDA article by T. Volesnichenko and Ye. Rusakov did acknowledge his suggestion to establish an agency within the International Monetary Fund to aid developing countries in the face of reduced demand for their exports. But the PRAVDA article pointed out that control of the agency would rest in the hands of the Western powers. Labeling such proposals "half-measures," PRAVDA asserted that the Secretary's message demonstrated that the West remains opposed to the developing countries' basic demand for restructuring economic relations, particularly to linking the price of their exports to the price of Western industrial goods.

Similar criticism was voiced the same day in a German-language broadcast commentary by Valentin Zakharov, who said that the remarks of the Secretary and FRG Foreign Minister Genscher demonstrated that they were trying to "preserve the basis of the established system" of subordinating the economies of developing countries to the interests of the Western states.

While Moscow also pointed out the conciliatory nature of the Secretary's remarks, it was quick to ascribe this to economic problems in the West. Thus, the PRAVDA article portrayed the U.S. proposals as "in the spirit" of recent U.S. attempts to "ease aggravated contradictions" with the developing countries. In addition, a short TASS summary of the Secretary's remarks asserted that he "admitted that the developing countries must play a part and have a voice in the system of international relationships." At the same time, TASS claimed that the Secretary's statement "tried to shift the blame" for the West's economic difficulties onto the developing countries, particularly the oil producers.

Moscow has described the Third World countries as reacting reservedly to the Secretary's proposals. For example, the PRAVDA article claimed that "many of his theses and proposals" had received a "guarded reception," while Zakharov asserted that they had been received "with special reserve and rejection."

K O R E A

PYONGYANG CONDEMNS SCHLESINGER VISIT TO ROK, JAPAN

North Korean media condemned U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 26-29 August talks with ROK and Japanese authorities in standard, harsh terms replete with personal invective against Schlesinger. Although DPRK comment accused Schlesinger of coming to Korea to push "war preparations," it did not go so far as to suggest that his trip left the situation measurably more strained or closer to war.

A 28 August NODONG SINMUN commentary calling Schlesinger "the most fiendish bellicose element" and a "war maniac to the marrow" charged that his visit was evidence of a U.S. attempt to keep its troops in South Korea permanently and to "prop up" the Pak Chong-hui government. The commentary denounced Schlesinger's "balance of forces" concept as an effort to divide Korea and a source of tension on the peninsula that contributed to the deterioration of North-South relations. It also scored U.S. efforts at "fostering" South Korean defense industries.

In a 1 September NODONG SINMUN commentary Pyongyang characterized the Japan portion of the trip as a U.S. effort to "inveigle Japanese reactionaries deeper into U.S. strategy," to draw the "aggressive forces of Japan on a full scale into aggression on Korea," and to strengthen the "triangular military alliance" between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The commentary suggested that U.S. and Japanese authorities have reached a "secret agreement" on the "secure use" of U.S. military bases in Japan against Korea, which Pyongyang called "an open expression of the unfriendly and hostile policy" of Tokyo toward the DPRK.

MOSCOW, PEKING COMMENT Soviet comment on Schlesinger's visits stressed that the United States was trying to draw Japan more tightly into the U.S.-ROK military alliance. Articles in the 24 August RED STAR and in NEW TIMES No. 34 keyed to the beginning of the Schlesinger trip stated that the United States had made a special effort at the Ford-Miki talks in August to include a clause on South Korea's "security" in the final communique, with RED STAR claiming that the Schlesinger visit was a further attempt to "draw Japan more deeply into this dangerous alliance."

As usual, Moscow media were only mildly critical of the U.S. position in the ROK, and gave virtually no attention to North Korean proposals for solving Korean questions. The only suggestion that

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U.S. troops be withdrawn from Korea appeared in the 24 August RED STAR article, which noted that "although sober appeals for a revision of U.S. policy in South Korea sometimes ring out even in the United States itself, certain circles in unison with the Pentagon are ignoring these demands, including the question of the withdrawal of U.S. troops--a question which has long been pressing."

Peking's response to Schlesinger's ROK visit has been limited to a replay of brief excerpts from the 28 August NODONG SINMUN commentary. Monitored PRC media have not yet referred to the Japan portion of the trip.

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INDOCHINA

VIETNAM MARKS 30TH DRV NATIONAL DAY, OPENING OF HO'S MAUSOLEUM

The 30th anniversary of the founding of the DRV was observed throughout Vietnam with the elaborate ceremonial trappings which would be expected for a decennial celebration and the first anniversary following the communist victory in South Vietnam. The entire Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo turned out in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square on the morning of the 1st for the usual anniversary rally, followed by a military parade which was described by VNA to have been the largest ever held in the Vietnamese capital. VWP Politburo member Pham Hung's presence in Hanoi, at the head of the South Vietnamese delegation to the celebration, was his first publicized return to North Vietnam since he went South in 1967. He is still identified, as he has been in appearances in South Vietnam since the communist takeover, both in his Politburo post and as the secretary of the South Vietnam Party Organization.

The Vietnamese anniversary also drew the first significant foreign delegations to Hanoi for national day celebrations in the last 15 years, including a Soviet delegation led by M.S. Solomentsev, CPSU Politburo candidate member and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and a Chinese group headed by Chen Hsi-lien, CCP Politburo member and vice premier.* The Soviet delegation arrived early in Hanoi to take a prominent part in a 29 August ceremony, addressed by VWP First secretary Le Duan, to inaugurate a mausoleum for Ho Chi Minh which was said to have been built with Soviet assistance and expertise. The foreign delegations and the delegation from South Vietnam were honored at a 2 September banquet attended by the top North Vietnamese leaders.

PHAM VAN DONG SPEECH In keeping with past tradition, the main address at the national day rally in Hanoi was delivered by Premier Pham Van Dong. He predictably dealt at length with the role of the "party leadership" in winning the "extremely great victories" over the French and "U.S. imperialism" but his remarks on domestic and foreign questions were perfunctory,

* Although foreign delegations have not attended DRV National Day celebrations in recent years, there was an unprecedented gathering of foreign leaders in Hanoi in September 1969, following the death of Ho Chi Minh. The foreign attendance at Ho's funeral was discussed in the TRENDS of 11 September 1969, pages 3-13, and in an FBIS SURVEY SUPPLEMENT of 15 September 1969, pages 5-12.

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giving no new evidence of Hanoi's future policies. Dong dwelt upon the need for unification of the North and South, but--like other communist statements since the takeover in the South--his speech did not indicate when or how unification would take place.

The subject of North-South reunification has been treated somewhat ambiguously in media statements by Vietnamese communist leaders. While asserting that both sections of the country are now unified, public pronouncements on the subject have ordinarily remained vague, leaving the impression that there is still no timetable for the formal merging of the two countries into one, with a single government and capital. Dong's discussion of unification followed a similar vein, but seemed to imply an increased urgency to implement unification and to suggest that the North Vietnamese leadership might choose to ignore any potential obstacles to the merger posed by the disparity between the North and South in the levels of economic, political, and social development.

The Premier appeared to be reflecting a reassessment of the current stage in the South's development when he characterized "the entire country [as now] . . . advancing toward socialism." By contrast, First Secretary Le Duan in his 15 May Victory Day speech had declared that the South should build "a national democratic regime" and a national and democratic economy and culture--a stage that would presumably long precede any "advance toward socialism."* Media discussion of the economic situation in the South provides scant evidence that the widespread preparations which an "advance toward socialism" would seem to require are in fact being made. While there have been scattered mentions of agricultural collectivism and rural labor exchange teams being organized on the local level in the South, there has been no publicity on any large-scale effort at land reform similar to what was carried out in the North in the 1950's.

Hanoi's concern about economic differences between the North and the South was underscored by the Premier's demand for "close cooperation between the DRV Government and the PRG . . . to settle all problems related to both zones of the country." Emphasizing that the South must bring its economy into conformity with the North's, Dong declared, "especially on the economic front, we must strive to bring new potentials into play in order to step up economic restoration and development, carry out socialist reforms, [and] build socialism" In another discussion of the southern economy the Premier mentioned a "nationwide plan" that is to be the basis for "new developmental steps" in the South, but he failed to elaborate on the plan's content.

* See the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, pages 1-4 for a discussion of Le Duan's Victory Day remarks.

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In referring to the South's role on the international level, Pham Van Dong made a somewhat obscure reference to the important role "Saigon, Ho Chi Minh City," will have in "many fields," including "foreign relations with Southeast Asian countries and the rest of the world." The remarks were made in the context of an economic discussion and may refer to a potential role for Saigon as an international trade center.

A 4 August VWP Central Committee "circular" setting forth guidance for the forthcoming National Day celebration had likewise emphasized the need for urgency in unification. According to the circular, now that South Vietnam has been "liberated," "the problem of national unification becomes an urgent demand of the Vietnamese revolution and of our entire people throughout the country."

The same 4 August circular also made mention of the "Fourth VWP Congress"--a topic not known to have been previously raised in DRV media, nor was it alluded to by Pham Van Dong in his National Day speech. Offering little indication as to the leadership's intentions for the long-delayed conclave, the circular simply stated in its introductory paragraph that "the 30th founding anniversary of the DRV is an occasion . . . for creating conditions for successfully implementing the resolution on the Fourth VWP Congress" Pham Van Dong's avoidance of the subject suggests that Hanoi is still not prepared to set a date for the congress, even though it is long overdue. The VWP has not held a party congress since September 1960, despite the stipulation in its party statutes they should be convened every four years. The 1960 congress was preceded by almost a year of reports of provincial preparations and other publicity.

VISITING DELEGATIONS There was extensive representation from both foreign governments and parties at the Hanoi national day ceremonies. State leaders present for the occasion ranged from such top-level personalities as Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and Prince Souphanouvong of Laos to the French minister of education, Rene Haby, and a Swedish parliamentarian. South Vietnam, in addition to its head delegate Pham Hung, was represented by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, Secretary of the Fifth Region Party Organization Vo Chi Cong, and PRG Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung. Media reports on the southern delegation have cited Trung as a member of the VWP Central Committee, thus including him in a growing list of southern officials who have been openly identified since the war as officials in the VWP apparatus.* The highest-

* See the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, pages 1-14 for a discussion of communist party leaders in South Vietnam.

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ranking foreign party leader at the festivities was Sanzo Nosaka, chairman of the Japan Communist Party, who was accorded the honor of being met on his arrival at the airport by First Secretary Le Duan.

SOUTH VIETNAM CELEBRATIONS The main South Vietnamese event on the DRV National Day anniversary was a "mass rally" in Saigon, addressed by NFLSV Central Committee Presidium Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho. Opening remarks at the rally were delivered by Lt Gen Tran Van Tra,* and others present at the ceremonies included Nguyen Van Linh, deputy secretary of the South Vietnam Party Organization, Vo Van Kiet, secretary of the "Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee" (Kiet is additionally listed as a VWP Central Committee member), and Lt Gen Le Trong Tan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army. A National Day reception held in Saigon on the evening of the 2d drew a similar contingent of officials and was also keynoted by Nguyen Huu Tho.

While Nguyen Huu Tho's remarks at the National Day rally on the need for South Vietnam to "advance toward socialism" are not as explicit as Pham Van Dong's, a reference by Tho to transforming "our poor backward country . . . into an impregnable fortress of national independence, democracy, and socialism . . ." could be construed as support for Pham Van Dong's remarks on the subject. Unlike, Dong, Tho did not depart from the standard rhetoric on unification in his speech, maintaining that the country was now unified but not spelling out the specifics.

PEKING SHOWS RESERVE IN MARKING DRV 30TH ANNIVERSARY

Celebrations in Peking marking the 30th DRV National Day were at a lower level than Chinese commemorations of the DRV's last quinquennial anniversaries in 1970 and 1965, and Chinese expressions of friendship and solidarity were also more reserved than in the past. The Chinese this year did, however, send a

* In addition to his usual title of chairman of the Saigon Military Management Committee, Tran Van Tra is cited as "commander of the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces"--an apparently new media identification for this position. A 16 February Liberation Radio broadcast on ceremonies marking the 14th anniversary of unification of the PLAF had merely listed Tra first along with Le Chan and Dong Van Cong as "members of the South Vietnam PLAF Command."

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special delegation led by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien to Hanoi for the anniversary--a standard Chinese practice to commemorate a decennial anniversary of a major communist ally, although Hanoi hosted no delegations during the wartime decennial in 1965.*

Peking's treatment of the anniversary this year included the customary congratulatory message from Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai on 1 September and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 2 September. There was also the usual 2 September DRV envoy's reception in Peking, attended this year by CCP Politburo members Teng Hsiao-ping, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wu Te, the latter addressing the gathering.

Peking celebrations for the last decennial anniversary, the 20th in 1965, had been considerably higher in level. The DRV envoy's reception in Peking that year had occasioned a heavier PRC leadership turnout, including six CCP Politburo members, and was addressed by Chou En-lai. Peking additionally had held a large rally attended by five Politburo members and addressed by Peking Mayor Peng Chen. Similarly, the less important DRV 25th anniversary in 1970 had occasioned slightly higher level treatment in Peking than this year. Peking in 1970 again held a rally, attended by three CCP Politburo members and addressed by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and the DRV envoy's reception drew three Politburo members and was again addressed by Chou En-lai.

Peking's expressions of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and support this year were more reserved in comparison with those employed in marking the DRV's 29th anniversary last year.** In the leaders' message last year, Mao, Chu and Chou had expressed their "warmest greetings," while this year they extended "warm congratulations." Their message this year hailed the "militant unity and revolutionary friendship" between the two peoples; the message last year had praised their "deep revolutionary friendship and militant solidarity based on Marxist-Leninist principles and proletarian internationalism" and had included a pledge to continue to perform

* Last year, for instance, Peking sent a delegation led by Politburo member Li Hsien-nien to Bucharest to celebrate Romania's 30th anniversary, and sent a delegation led by Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan to Tirana on Albania's 30th national day. For Peking's treatment of the DRV's 20th anniversary in 1965 and of the 25th anniversary in 1970, see the TRENDS of 2 September 1965, pages 31-32 and of 2 September 1970, pages 6-7.

** Peking's treatment of the 29th DRV anniversary is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 September 1974, pages 11-12.

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"internationalist duties" of supporting the Vietnamese people's "just cause." The 2 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial last year had included in full long-standard expressions of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity, as nourished personally by Chairman Mao and President Ho on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and had reiterated the leaders' message pledge to perform "proletarian internationalist duties." By contrast, the editorial this year characterized the two countries as "friendly socialist neighbors" and "close comrades in arms," and only expressed hope that the "militant friendship" between them would be continuously consolidated and developed.

CHEN HSI-LIEN SPEECH Warmer Chinese expressions of solidarity with Vietnam were offered to the head of the Chinese delegation to the DRV, Chen Hsi-lien, in his 3 September speech to a rally at the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel complex, which was built with Chinese assistance. At the same time--as reported by NCNA--Chen took the occasion to polemically admonish the Vietnamese on the sensitive issue of the danger in Southeast Asia and the world of the intensified competition of "both" superpowers. Chen assured his Vietnamese audience that the consolidation of the "fraternal friendship and militant solidarity" between the two nations on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism conformed to the "fundamental interests" and constituted the "common desire" of the two peoples. He also recalled that in the past struggle against "U.S. imperialist aggression," the Chinese had supported Vietnam "to the best of our ability" as "an internationalist obligation incumbent upon us," and he affirmed that China would do its "utmost" to consolidate relations in the future. At the same time, the vice premier said that "we must take notice" of superpower rivalry as "the root cause" of world unrest and the source of "a new world war." While noting that superpower contention was focused in the West, Chen affirmed that the superpowers, were "doing their utmost to place other countries under their sphere of influence" in Asia as well, and he added specific praise for Southeast Asian countries' continuing struggle against "superpower intervention."

KOSYGIN SPEECH HIGHLIGHTS USSR CELEBRATION OF DRV ANNIVERSARY

The 30th DRV founding anniversary received special attention with the appearance of Premier Kosygin at the DRV ambassador's reception on 29 August. At the same time, the event occasioned the usual congratulatory message from Soviet leaders to their DRV counterparts and a Soviet-Vietnamese friendship society meeting attended by Politburo member Mazurov. There was only routine-level Soviet

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press attention to this anniversary, although the last two DRV National Day quinquennial celebrations had received Moscow editorial comment.

Kosygin is the highest-ranking Soviet official to attend DRV anniversary ceremonies in Moscow in the past 15 years. Previous DRV ambassador receptions have usually merited a CPSU Politburo member at the level of a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers as head of the Soviet contingent. Last year Politburo member Polyanskiy and Secretariat member Dolgikh attended; in 1970, on the 25th anniversary, Politburo members Mazurov and Ustalov and Secretariat member Katushev represented the Soviet Union; Mazurov also appeared at the 1965 reception commemorating the 20th anniversary. This year Kosygin was accompanied at the reception by Politburo candidate member Demichev, Secretariat member Kapitonov, Supreme Soviet Presidium Deputy Chairman Kholov, and Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Novikov.

In his reception remarks, carried by PRAVDA on 30 August, Kosygin called attention to Soviet economic assistance to Vietnam and stated that there was "steadily widening cooperation" between the two countries on the basis of proletarian internationalist principles and in line with the interests of the two peoples and world socialism. He reaffirmed standard pledges of Soviet willingness to assist in the restoration of the DRV's economy and cited Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet Union had "constantly given and will continue to give all-round aid and support to the Vietnamese people."

This year's message of greetings from Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin to DRV leaders Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong followed the general pattern of previous anniversary messages in praising the successes of the VWP and the Vietnamese people. The letter echoed Kosygin's reaffirmation of continued Soviet "aid and support" to Vietnam, recalling that the Soviet "people" had "always been with the Vietnamese people--in the days of severe trial and the joyous days of victory, in peaceful building and in combat."

PRAVDA on 2 September devoted an entire page to items pegged to the DRV anniversary, carrying features which were said to have been prepared by the DRV party paper NHAN DAN. On 28 August, PRAVDA also ran a review of a recently published edition of Le Duan's speeches since 1970, lauding the first secretary as an "outstanding figure" in the VWP and the international communist movement. IZVESTIYA, on 31 August, and SOVIET RUSSIA, in its 19 August edition, carried signed articles recounting the history of the Vietnamese struggle and the importance of Soviet aid to the "complete and definitive victory" in Vietnam.

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DRV ECONOMIC DELEGATION HOLDS TALKS IN MOSCOW, MEETS KOSYGIN

DRV and Soviet negotiators held talks on economic, scientific and technical cooperation but issued no formal agreements during an 18-26 August visit to the Soviet Union by a DRV economic delegation led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi.* Vietnamese, but not Soviet media, have reported that Moscow's aid to Vietnam for the coming year was specifically considered during the talks. Both Hanoi and Moscow media reported that the delegation was received by Premier Kosygin on 25 August and from the 21st through the 25th attended the second session of the Soviet-Vietnamese inter-governmental committee for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The committee was created as part of the December 1972 USSR-DRV aid agreement, and its first session in Moscow from 22 to 24 July 1974 was also attended by Le Thanh Nghi.**

As was the case in 1974, the Soviet delegation to this year's talks was led by Central Committee member and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.N. Novikov, who also hosted a reception for the Vietnamese on 19 August. Other participants in the talks were similar to those last year, including officials from both sides' planning, foreign trade, and scientific and technological organs, and Soviet industrial experts.

VNA accounts of the sessions of the USSR-DRV economic, scientific and technical cooperation committee reported that the two sides had reviewed the implementation of past agreements, held talks on "Soviet aid to Vietnam for 1976," and discussed the development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation in the "1976-1980 period." Soviet reporting on the sessions did not specifically refer to assistance to the DRV for 1976, noting instead that the committee considered the "further expansion of economic and trade cooperation" in the coming five years, and "rehabilitation and construction" projects to the DRV national economy. It is possible that an agreement on Soviet assistance to the DRV will be signed later this year in either Moscow or Hanoi. The DRV-Soviet aid agreement for 1975 was signed in Moscow in December 1974--four months after Le Thanh Nghi's visit to the Soviet Union. The last time an aid agreement was signed in Hanoi was during Soviet President Podgornyy's October 1971 visit to North Vietnam.

* The delegation arrived in Moscow after a Peking visit, which is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 15-16.

** The DRV delegation's 1974 visit to Moscow was discussed in the TRENDS of 31 July 1974, pages 14-16.

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TASS and VNA carried similar descriptions of the topics discussed at Le Thanh Nghi's 25 August meeting with Premier Kosygin, including economic cooperation during the next five years, economic rehabilitation and development matters, and the strengthening of "fraternal relations." Following the pattern used last year, Hanoi's reports of the meeting with Kosygin suggested a warm atmosphere of "militant solidarity, fraternity and friendship," while TASS characterized the atmospherics as "friendly and cordial."

PHNOM PENH NOTES SIHANOUK TO RETURN, REPORTS FOREIGN TRAVELS

Phnom Penh radio on 1 September acknowledged for the first time that Cambodian Prince Sihanouk would return to Cambodia in the "near future." The disclosure was contained in a radio report on remarks to foreign newsmen by RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary while he was attending the nonaligned conference in Lima, Peru. Without elaboration, the radio quoted Ieng Sary as saying that "Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, chief of State and chairman of the NUFC, will return to the Cambodian fatherland in the near future." Previously, the only indication in communist media that Sihanouk would be returning to Cambodia was contained in a 20 August KCNA report of Kim Il-song's speech at a Pyongyang banquet that day for Sihanouk and a visiting RGNU delegation led by Prime Minister Penn Nouth and Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. KCNA had quoted Kim as stating that the Cambodian delegation had come "to accompany Samdech Norodom Sihanouk home!"*

Phnom Penh at this same time has given heightened attention to the Prince's activities following closely his foreign travels since his 22 August departure from the DPRK in the company of Penn Nouth and Khieu Samphan. The radio, along with NCNA, reported the meetings in Peking of Chou En-lai with Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan on 26 August, and of Chairman Mao with the same Cambodians on the 29th. The radio, as well as Vietnamese media, have given full coverage to the 30 August-4 September visit to Hanoi of the RGNU delegation with Sihanouk as leader and Khieu Samphan as deputy leader for the 30th anniversary of the DRV National Day. Both VNA and Phnom Penh noted in particular the "warm solidarity and fraternal friendship" which surrounded the delegation's meetings with DRV leaders Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Troung Chinh, and Pham Van Dong on 31 August.

* The visit of the RGNU delegation to the DPRK and its contacts with Sihanouk are discussed in the TRENDS of 27 August 1975, pages 18-19.

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C O R R E C T I O N

An article on the communist Lao Revolutionary Party that appeared in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975 erroneously stated on page 25 that the second part of the LRP secretary general's 23 March 1974 19th anniversary letter to party members was not known to have been broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao. The second part of the letter was broadcast on the 23 March 1974 dictation-speech voicecast.

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

LI CHIANG HITS SUPERPOWERS, LAUDS THIRD WORLD AT UNGA SESSION

PRC Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang's 2 September keynote Chinese address at the UN General Assembly's 7th special session reiterated and elaborated upon established Peking charges of "superpower" international economic exploitation, while indicating that the superpowers had weakened considerably and the Third World was gaining political and economic strength. Peking's concept of the superpowers' exploitative role in world economic affairs had been set forth authoritatively at the last UNGA special session in April 1974, in an address by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.* Li's remarks at the current session, however, were more explicit than Teng's in depicting the USSR as the Third World's main enemy and reflected greater Chinese confidence in the growing strength and unity of Third World countries. Li also extended Teng's portrayal of the developed nations of the so-called "Second World"--generally construed as Japan and the European industrial states--to suggest they were becoming increasingly independent of superpower manipulation.

After reciting Peking's usual litany against detente and on the threat of world war stemming from U.S.-Soviet international rivalry, Li Chiang focused criticism on superpower economic policies. Li duly attacked U.S. efforts to protect its "vested interests" in the existing world economic system, but he aimed the bulk of his invective against Moscow for alleged economic exploitation of East Europe and the Third World. Accusing Moscow of using economic aid, arms shipments, and loans to manipulate and bring developing states into its sphere of influence, the minister bluntly stated that the USSR "in the guise of a 'friend' is more greedy, insidious and unscrupulous than old-line imperialism." Li went on to underline a warning, recently stressed in Chinese comment, that developing nations should not relax their guard after driving out "one imperialism" because "the other imperialism under the banner of 'socialism' seizes the opportunity to squeeze its way in."

At the 1974 special UNGA session Teng Hsiao-ping had warned against overestimating the strength of the superpowers and had expressed hope that the Third World states would strengthen unity to struggle for victories against U.S.-Soviet hegemonism. By contrast, Li Chiang this year depicted the superpowers as seriously weakened

* Teng Hsiao-ping's 10 April 1974 address is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 1-4.

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and portrayed the strength of united Third World countries as a well-established fact. Lauding the power of the developing nations, the minister stated that "now it is evident to everyone that the Third World countries and peoples have stood up," adding that "the days are gone forever when the superpowers could willfully rule the fate of small, weak and poor nations." In the same vein, Li hailed the "growing struggle" on the part of the developed, Second World states against U.S.-USSR control, in contrast to Teng's condemnation of the superpowers for their dominance of these states. In particular, Li Chiang lauded the developed countries' increased unity with the Third World raw material producers against the two big powers.

On specific economic issues, Li Chiang repeated Teng's position of last year--that developing countries should strive for self-reliance, but not "self-seclusion," on the basis of their individual economic conditions, and that they should use foreign assistance as an auxiliary. Li offered specific support for recent Third World demands that the developed countries undertake concrete commitments to developing countries on giving material and technological aid, and he supported the demand for the establishment of a "fair and equitable link" between the prices paid for Third World raw materials and the prices of developed states' manufactured products. Capitalizing on recent world concern over the effect of large Soviet purchases of U.S. and other countries' grain, the minister also voiced opposition to the "superpower practice of monopolizing the grain trade" and their "selfishly stirring up troubles to upset the international grain market and thereby creating difficulties for developing countries."

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CHINA

MAO DIRECTS LITERARY CRITICISM AT "CAPITULATIONISTS" IN RANKS

An authoritative 4 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial indicates Chairman Mao Tse-tung is behind the recently launched national literary attack on the popular 13th Century novel "Shui Hu" (also known as "Water Margin" or "All Men Are Brothers"), a novel which Mao had seemed to favor at one time. The editorial, released by NCNA on 3 September, contained new instructions from Mao calling for use of the novel as "teaching material by negative example" to "enable the people to know the capitulationists." Study of the novel, according to Mao's instructions, should be focused on the "struggle of one faction against another within the landlord class" and should examine the "capitulation" of Sung Chiang, the hero of the novel who failed to oppose the emperor, accepted a royal amnesty, and then worked to suppress the peasant revolt he had previously led. The editorial called for "vast numbers of worker-peasant-soldier backbone theorists, professional theoretical workers, cadres and the masses" to take an "active part" in discussion of the novel in order to "get to the bottom of these questions of vital importance."

The editorial crediting Mao with initiating the campaign came ten days after "Shui Hu" criticism was launched in a special page of the 23 August KWANGMING DAILY. Peking radio on 27 August had announced that the six lead articles of the September RED FLAG journal would be devoted to "Shui Hu" criticism, the KWANGMING DAILY published a criticism by major commentator Liang Hsiao on 30 August, and PEOPLE'S DAILY picked up a RED FLAG commentary and printed another article on the 31st. None of the early articles credited Mao with initiating the "Shui Hu" campaign, and the theme of the articles, which lashed out at the collusion between feudal emperors and corrupt peasant leaders who would accept "amnesty" rather than continue the struggle, raised the possibility that the articles might be directed at Mao himself.

While Mao is often symbolized as an emperor in historical discussions relating to current issues, in "Shui Hu" he seems to be represented by the "founder" of the peasant revolt, Chao Kai. In Mao's instruction on "Shui Hu," as printed in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, he notes that Chao Kai's principles were changed by his successor Sung Chiang. The concern for succession and the use of obscure literary debate in current struggles are characteristic of Mao, indicating that he is personally behind the campaign.

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If Mao is the "founder" of the revolutionary forces, the emperor and his advisers are more likely to represent the usual Chinese bugbears--imperialists, Kuomintang reactionaries, and the Soviet Union. Mao dubbed Sung Chiang a "capitulationist," a term usually used now for those who favor closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Sung figure seems to be another modeled in the Lin Piao-Liu Shao-chi tradition, a leader who rises to the top of the revolution only to sell it out to its enemies.

In the criticism of "Shui Hu," Sung Chiang's errors center around the issue of amnesty. Sung Chiang wants imperial amnesty and thus only takes the revolution part way, opposing the ministers but not the emperor. Amnesty has been a sensitive subject in China since the cultural revolution, when many leaders were attacked for betraying the revolution in order to gain amnesty from the Kuomintang. More recently the issue of amnesty for cultural revolution victims seems to have been the source of considerable friction. The most prominent rehabilitee is Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, and if the emperor did indeed symbolize Mao, who amnestied Teng, then the current campaign would apparently be aimed primarily at Teng and other recently returned leaders. It seems highly unlikely that any grouping of remnant cultural revolution leaders would have the power to launch a coordinated central media campaign which attacked not only Teng but Mao as well.

Mao presumably had some particular target or targets in mind when he initiated the campaign, but recent such campaigns suggest that no top leadership purges will necessarily follow. Both the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign beginning in 1973 and the dictatorship of the proletariat campaign earlier this year failed to produce major purges, perhaps because opposing sides were too evenly balanced, possibly because Mao had intended the campaigns as warnings and intended to resort to purges only if they were not heeded.

The "Shui Hu" campaign also serves as a warning to lower-level factional leaders and their followers--at a time when troops have had to restore order in Chekiang and to a lesser extent in other areas--that false revolutionary leaders abound and that revolutionary discipline must be maintained.

MAO AND "SHUI HU" Mao had previously made favorable remarks about "Shui Hu" and its hero Sung Chiang, who is now the chief villain accused of betraying the revolution. In "On Contradiction," written in August 1934 and printed in his "Selected Works," volume I, page 324, Mao wrote:

In the novel Shui Hu, Sung Chiang thrice attacked Chu Village. Twice he was defeated, because he was ignorant of the local conditions and used the

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wrong method. Later he changes his method; first he investigated the situation, and he familiarized himself with the maze of roads, then he broke up the alliance between the Li, Hui and Chu Villages and sent his men in disguise into the enemy camp to lie in wait, using a stratagem similar to that of the Trojan Horse in the foreign story. And on the third occasion he won. There are many examples of materialist dialectics in Shui Hu, of which the episode of the three attacks on Chu Village is one of the best.

All of the current works denounce Sung Chiang without qualification. The 31 August PEOPLE'S DAILY article by Chu Fang-ming, for example, attacked the view of "some commentaries" which describe Sung as having a dual personality "both compromising and revolutionary in character." According to the article, Sung's personality "was not split but whole--he was an out-and-out capitulationist" and "there was nothing revolutionary in him."

PREVIOUS PUBLICATION
OF "SHUI HU"

"Shui Hu" was published as recently as 1972 by Peking, with a preface indicating that Sung Chiang was a good character.

The abridged version published then was the same version criticized in the recent articles by Liang Hsiao in the 30 August KWANGMING DAILY and in a RED FLAG article by Fang Yen-liang. In praising Lu Hsun's criticism of "Shui Hu", Liang noted Lu Hsun's attack on the abridged version compiled by 17th century scholar Chin Sheng-tan. Liang attacked this Chin version for trying to "conceal Sung Chiang's repulsive features in practicing capitulationism." The RED FLAG article by Fang also faulted Chin's "savagely abridged" version, criticizing him for not realizing that "Sung Chiang and the like are not robber ringleaders at all but faithful agents of the landlord class" and thereby producing a version "quite welcome by those who eulogize Sung Chiang."

In the version published in 1972, presumably with the support of someone in the leadership, Chin was not seen as favoring Sung Chiang, but quite the reverse. The preface to the edition specifically criticized Chin for changing "the original text to vilify Sung Chiang and the other heroes."

PROVINCIAL RESPONSE

Provincial radios have replayed the major central press articles on the campaign but have been slow to originate their own comment on the new literary debate. At this writing only two provinces, Shanghai and Kwangtung, have broadcast commentaries criticizing "Shui Hu."

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Shanghai radio on 1 September reported on a recent study meeting held by the municipal party committee which characterized the need to criticize "Shui Hu" as one of the tasks in the continuing campaign to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. The report noted that "recently newspapers and other publications have begun discussion and criticism of 'Shui Hu'" because it "only opposed corrupt officials, but not the emperor." The broadcast called for a "full-scale criticism" of the novel so that "the people will know the true feature of the capitulationists." Canton radio on 2 September broadcast a SOUTHERN DAILY article which argued that correctly commenting on the novel was "related to the big question of exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie." The article criticized the novel for distorting the concept of peasant revolts by presenting "peasant uprisings as not aiming at overthrowing the feudal rulers but at getting a royal pardon and being promoted as officials."

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U S S R

OFFICIAL URGES TIGHTER PARTY CONTROL OVER ECONOMIC MANAGERS

The chronic issue of mixed jurisdictions between Soviet party officials and economic managers was the subject of a 24 August SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article by Lithuanian party Second Secretary V.I. Kharazov. Asserting that economic specialists had acquired an increasingly dominant role in economic decision-making, Kharazov urged that party officials exercise a correspondingly greater role in selecting economic managers. Apparently concerned that the increasing professionalization of managerial personnel also posed a threat to the party's traditional supervisory role, Kharazov called for a codification of party rights in this regard. His article recalled Brezhnev's December 1973 CPSU plenum speech in which he attacked the "technocratic" approach to economic decision-making and called for an increased party role in this sphere.

Kharazov declared that the decision of the 24th CPSU Congress broadening the party organizations' rights to check the work of their ministries has proved to be of "indisputable value" and that the "need has developed to grant similar rights in work with cadres." He explained that in some ministries in his republic economic managers enlisted party advice in selecting candidates for the posts of chiefs and deputy chiefs of administrations and departments. But, he wrote, "many party officials" felt that this procedure should be codified as a right of party organizations. Kharazov conceded that party organizations of ministries have always played a role in cadre selection and "at first glance there is nothing new here." But, he argued, in recent years there have been big changes in economic management and now the overwhelming majority of top managers are economic specialists. Kharazov implied that it was the trend of more and more domination of economic management by economic specialists--potentially independent of the party--that has made it necessary to intensify and codify party control over selection of economic cadres.

Kharazov's proposal appeared to reflect the general attitudes expressed in Brezhnev's December 1973 CPSU plenum condemnation of "technocrats" and call for increased party influence in economic decision-making.* Party assertiveness in economic management

* See the Supplementary Article "Contention Over Party Role in Leading Soviet Economy" in the 14 August 1974 TRENDS, and the article "Brezhnev Protege Urges Stronger Party Role in Economy" in the 5 September 1974 TRENDS, pages 15-18.

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reached a high point in October 1974 with Brezhnev's address to the Council of Ministers laying down economic policy lines for 1975. This was a rare and obvious intrusion into Kosygin's apparatus and economic sphere of responsibility. In addition, a November Central Committee decree on the party committee of the Communications Ministry, published in the 22 November 1974 PRAVDA, declared that the ministry officials were doing poor work and ordered the ministry's party committee to intensify its checking on these officials. A 28 November 1974 PRAVDA editorial declared that the decree's order to intensify party checking applied to all party organizations of all ministries.

Since late 1974, party pressure to intervene in economic leadership had appeared to slacken, with articles on the party role in the economy stressing both the need to avoid petty supervision as well as the need for party control. The only notable public pressure during 1975 came at a 4 June Moscow Gorkom plenum, where Moscow Second Secretary L.I. Grekov assailed economic leaders for lowering production goals and committing other violations of discipline and declared it the task of party committees of ministries to intensify checking on their ministries and to crack down on abuses. The conservative Moscow city organization, which supervises the party organizations of the Moscow-based USSR ministries, has long pushed for more party intervention. For instance, at an 18 October 1974 city plenum, Secretary L.A. Borisov demanded that party committees of ministries establish effective checking on ministry officials and require their adherence to higher standards.

* See the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 23-24.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON MBFR: A Soviet commentator, by belatedly highlighting a broadcast remark by President Ford, has suggested that Moscow is anticipating a new Western initiative when the Vienna force reduction talks resume on 22 September. NOVOSTI political observer Spartak Beglov, writing in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 21 August, reported President Ford as saying in a 7 August television interview with the Public Broadcasting System that the Western allies are "now evidently shifting together toward a new position." Emphasizing that the President's remark "had not escaped the notice of attentive observers," Beglov said this provided grounds for "fresh hopes" that the cause of reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe would start making headway in "the near future." Beglov had made the standard Soviet charge that Western proposals to date had ignored the "fundamental principle of not disrupting the balance of security, taking into account all types of armed forces and armaments"--a clear allusion to the West's past reluctance to bring air forces and nuclear weapons into the negotiations. The initial 8 August TASS account of President Ford's interview had reported him as saying only that he saw "encouraging prospects" for an "additional breakthrough," ignoring his reference to a "new" Western position.

MOSCOW ON JAPAN TREATY: A 19 August Moscow radio commentary in Japanese has provided Moscow's first extensive public discussion of a Soviet proposal for a Soviet-Japanese treaty of "good neighborly cooperation." Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had first broached the idea for such a treaty during Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa's visit to Moscow in January 1975. A cooperation treaty was then formally proposed to the Japanese in February in a letter from Brezhnev to Prime Minister Miki, but Tokyo immediately rejected the idea. While not specifically acknowledging Japan's negative official response to the treaty proposal, the 19 August commentary did concede there was Japanese opposition, referring to a "plot" in Japan to spread the impression that the treaty of "good neighborly cooperation" would be a substitute for a peace agreement. The commentary stated that, on the contrary, while the cooperation treaty would "determine the major direction for further developing Soviet-Japanese relations in political, economic, and other fields," it would be a "guidepost on the path" to a peace treaty, rather than a substitute for it. According to the commentary, a Soviet-Japanese peace agreement is not currently possible because of Japan's "territorial demand" (a reference to Japan's claim to four northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union after World War II). The commentary claimed that concluding a cooperation treaty would solidify "bilateral relations" while allowing continuing "exchanges of opinion on conclusion of a

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peace treaty," including discussions of the territorial "problem." The commentary also again cautioned Japan not to include an "antihegemony" clause in the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty as demanded by China, warning that such an action "will have negative effects on Soviet-Japanese relations."

PERUVIAN COUP REACTION: Moscow and Havana have responded in low-key fashion to the 29 August ouster of Peruvian President Velasco Alvarado, indicating that they regarded the coup simply as a change of leaders and not an abandonment of the leftist policies pursued by the Velasco-led military government since it assumed power in 1968. In initial reaction on the 29th, TASS reported that Velasco had been forced out by his second-in-command, Prime Minister Morales Bermudez, going on to quote a PRENSA LATINA correspondent as saying that "the process of reforms started in the country will be continued." In a fuller report following President Morales Bermudez' statement that "nothing will be able to change our Peruvian revolution one single inch," TASS on 30 August noted that the Peruvian armed forces' communique on the coup "underlined that the revolutionary process will be continued within the framework of its initial ideological and political concepts." Reporting the coup on the 29th, Havana domestic service also took note of the armed forces communique, pointing out that it had stated "the revolution will pursue its present course." The Havana report added that journalists attending the nonaligned conference (which was meeting in Lima at the time of the government change) had observed that "the appointment of Morales Bermudez would signify a consolidation of the progressive advances made by the Peruvian revolutionary process."

CZECH ANTI-U.S. COMMENT: A speech by CPCZ General Secretary and CSSR President Gustav Husak on 30 August in Nitra, Slovakia, in which he angrily denounced the role of American helicopter pilot Barry Meeker in the airlifting from Czechoslovakia of East German refugees, added high-level authority to the increasingly anti-U.S. tone of recent Czechoslovak comment on the refugee incidents. But while Husak harshly characterized Meeker as "an American who acquired experience in the dirty war and the killing of Vietnamese people," he was also careful to describe the pilot as merely "irresponsible," unlike earlier Czech press comment which had implied official U.S. backing for Meeker. A highly vituperative 22 August RUDE PRAVO article entitled "Killer From Vietnam at Lipno," for example, had strongly implied that Meeker was paid by U.S. official circles for the helicopter flights "just as" he had been paid for "his bloody service in the Vietnam slaughter." A Kosina article in Bratislava PRAVDA on the 28th cited unspecified U.S. press charges that an "alleged anti-American campaign" was being carried on in the Czechoslovak press, radio, and TV. Earlier, on the 20th, RUDE PRAVO had attacked a New York TIMES editorial of 12 August entitled

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"'Normalized' Prague?" which had raised the issue of an anti-American campaign in the Czechoslovak media. At that time RUDE PRAVO dismissed the TIMES editorial as anti-Czechoslovak propaganda but ignored the charge alleging there was an anti-American campaign.

PYONGYANG ON NONALINEMENT: A 28 August NODONG SINMUN editorial greeting the DPRK's admission to the nonaligned group of nations at the 25-29 August nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting in Lima made an unusual effort to connect nonalignment with the socialist cause, a linkage Pyongyang had not attempted to make prior to its admission to the group. The NODONG SINMUN editorial, available thus far only in a 28 August KCNA English summary, stated that the nonaligned movement "conforms with the ideal of socialism," claiming also that the DPRK's membership in the nonaligned group accords with the "desire and interest of the peoples of the socialist countries" and is favorable to "advancing the cause of socialism." Possibly responding to critics of the DPRK's application to the nonaligned group, the editorial dubbed the current emergence of nonaligned and third world countries a "new era of national liberation" and stated that the struggle of the newly emerging forces "contains in itself the struggle for socialism" and that nonalignment is a "dependable ally" of socialism. NODONG SINMUN lauded North Korea's "independent foreign policy," crediting the DPRK's admission into the nonaligned group to Pyongyang's independence in all "external activities." The editorial also noted that DPRK admission to the nonaligned group had strengthened the international position of the DPRK, creating a favorable situation for "independent reunification" of Korea.

YUGOSLAV-ARAB DIFFERENCES: At the 25-29 August nonaligned countries ministerial conference in Lima, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic voiced Belgrade's opposition to Arab efforts to oust Israel from the United Nations. Minic, in a speech on the 26th, urged the nonaligned countries to resist the "temptation" to take any measures that would "be to the advantage of those forces which are trying to diminish the role of the United Nations or paralyze or wreck it as much as possible." Later, in a 30 August interview, Minic asserted that the conference debate on the issue could have been avoided if "some of our very close friends" had displayed more tact and realized that they lacked the backing of other nonaligned countries. Minic, in his conference remarks, indicated further dissatisfaction with the Arab countries by implying that the oil producers had failed to provide adequate financial aid to the other developing countries.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25 - 31 AUGUST 1975

Moscow (2499 items)

Portugal	(6%)	8%
China	(5%)	6%
Vietnam	(2%)	6%
[National Day	(1%)	5%]
European Security	(7%)	4%
Conference		
Nonaligned Foreign Minis-	(--)	2%
ters Conference, Lima		
UNGA 7th Special	(--)	2%
Session		

Peking (752 items)

Nonaligned Foreign Ministers	(--)	9%
Conference, Lima		
Indochina	(22%)	5%
[Cambodia	(21%)	3%]*
[DRV National Day	(--)	1%]
European Security	(3%)	3%
Conference		
USSR	(4%)	3%
Taiwan	(1%)	3%
Japan	(3%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Knieu Samphan, as well as Sihanouk's visit to Vietnam.